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Examining the Merits of Dual Regulation                                
for Single-Stock Futures:                                                                 
How the Divergent Insider Trading Regimes for Federal 
Futures and Securities Markets Demonstrate                     
the Necessity for (and Virtual Inevitability of) Dual CFTC-
SEC Regulation for Single-Stock Futures 
ZACHARY T. KNEPPER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Single-stock futures are a recent addition to the financial landscape in 
the United States and provide retail and institutional investors with a new 
tool for investment or speculation.  So far, the market response to these 
instruments has been cool.  Some observers have argued that the regulatory 
framework for single-stock futures is a cause of the lack of investor inter-
est.  Single-stock futures are regulated by both the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (“SEC”), and this system of dual regulation has been criticized as 
overly burdensome and unnecessary. 
This paper supports the current system of single-stock futures regula-
tion.  Specifically, this paper argues that dual regulation of single stock 
futures is necessary because the United States has divided commodities 
and securities regulation between two federal agencies while single-stock 
futures have one foot squarely in each camp.  There are many issues that 
demonstrate the necessity for dual regulation, but this paper relies primar-
ily on insider trading to argue the point.  Although it is clear that market 
interest in single-stock futures has so far been limited, this paper asserts 
that Congress should avoid making any radical changes to the dual-
regulatory regime and instead should allow the market to develop under 
the current system. 
  
    *   B.S., United States Military Academy, 1995; J.D., University of Illinois College of Law, 2003; 
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 2004.  The author is an associate in the Washington, D.C. 
office of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP and wrote this paper as part of an LL.M. pro-
gram in Securities and Financial Regulation at Georgetown University.  The opinions expressed herein 
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Fried Frank, its attorneys, or cli-
ents.   
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II.  BACKGROUND ON SINGLE-STOCK FUTURES 
Futures are contracts to buy or sell a specific quantity of some asset at 
a specified price and date in the future.1  “Futures” are thus simply con-
tracts for the future delivery of something (such as a commodity; wheat for 
instance), and the underlying asset upon which a future is based can theo-
retically be anything that can be bought or sold.  In this way, futures are 
derivatives - that is, their value derives from the underlying asset upon 
which they are based.   
Futures trading and the futures markets in the United States are regu-
lated by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission by operation of the 
federal Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”).2  The CEA does not actually 
define the term “futures,” but instead makes the term meaningful through 
operation of the statute.3  Specifically, the CFTC has authority from Con-
gress to regulate all “contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery.”4  
Thus, anything that qualifies as a “commodity” and that is traded by a con-
tract for future delivery falls under the CFTC’s purview.  Since Congress 
defined the term commodity broadly under the statute, virtually anything 
traded for future delivery can potentially become subject to CFTC regula-
tion.5   
Based on the breadth of the term “commodity” under the CEA, it fol-
lows that a contract for the future delivery of a security would fall within 
the CFTC’s responsibility as well.  In the 1970s, this was a point of conten-
tion between the CFTC and the Securities Exchange Commission, which is 
responsible for regulating the securities markets.6  Conflict over the regula-
tion of securities futures came to a head in 1982 in Board of Trade of the 
City of Chicago v. SEC, wherein the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals de-
termined that securities futures regulation was properly the province of the 
CFTC by the terms of the Commodities Exchange Act.7  In response to this 
ruling and to settle jurisdictional questions over securities futures, the SEC 
  
 1. See e.g. Kennedy Mitchell, Single Stock Futures: An Investor’s Guide 215 (John Wiley & Sons 
2002).  
 2. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2000) (“The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . with 
respect to accounts, agreements . . . and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for 
future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market designated or derivatives transaction execution 
facility registered pursuant to section 5 or 5a or any other board of trade, exchange, or market, and 
transactions subject to regulation by the Commission pursuant to section 19 of this Act.”). 
 3. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2000) (definitions section of the Commodities Exchange Act). 
 4. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). 
 5. See Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982).   
 6. E.g. CFTC and SEC: Issues Related to the Shad-Johnson Jurisdictional Accord, Government 
Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters, GGD-00-89 at 5 (April 2000) (available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00089.pdf) (hereinafter “GAO Shad-Johnson Report”). 
 7. See Bd. of Trade, 677 F.2d at 1155-59. 
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and the CFTC approached Congress with a proposed regulatory agreement 
known as the Shad-Johnson Accord, which was enacted into law in 1982.  
Shad-Johnson trifurcated securities futures and options regulation: the SEC 
would regulate securities-based options, the CFTC would regulate futures 
of broad-based stock indexes and government securities, and futures on 
single stocks and narrow-based stock indexes would be prohibited.8  This 
prohibition on single-stock futures and narrow-based stock index futures 
was intended to be temporary.9 
Futures on single stocks or narrow-based stock indexes are known col-
lectively as “single-stock futures.”  (Narrow-based stock indexes—a stock 
index containing only a handful of stocks—are included within the term 
“single-stock futures” because these indexes can approximate the value of 
a single-stock within the index and thus serve as a proxy for an individual 
security.)10  Congress prohibited single-stock futures in 1982 because of 
the SEC’s concern that these instruments could be used to manipulate the 
securities markets.11  Specifically, Congress accepted the SEC’s concern 
that single-stock futures act as a very close substitute for the securities 
upon which they are based (because the futures contract is simply a form 
of delivery of the security)12 and therefore the regulation of single-stock 
futures must be made consistent with the overall framework of federal se-
curities regulation.13  Given the Seventh Circuit’s determination that sin-
gle-stock futures are futures to be regulated by the CFTC,14 Congress de-
cided to prohibit these instruments pending a review by the CFTC and SEC 
on how to properly regulate them.  This review never happened, however, 
and the temporary ban on single-stock futures enacted through the Shad-
Johnson Accord became permanent. 
III.  THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME 
The ban on single-stock futures lasted until December 2000, when 
Congress lifted it as part of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 
  
 8. See e.g. David B. Esau, Student Author, Joint Regulation of Single Stock Futures: Cause or 
Result of Regulatory Arbitrage and Interagency Turf Wars?, 51 Cath. U.L. Rev. 917, 921-22 (2002). 
 9. GAO Shad-Johnson Report, supra n. 6, at 6.  
 10. See e.g. William J. Brodsky, The Globalization of Stock Index Futures: A Summary of the Mar-
ket and Regulatory Developments in Stock Index Futures and the Regulatory Hurdles Which Exist for 
Foreign Stock Index Futures in the United States, 15 Nw. J. Intl. L. & Bus. 248, 290 (1994). 
 11. See id.; see also GAO Shad-Johnson Report, supra n. 6, at 7. 
 12. See e.g. Annette Nazareth, Testimony Concerning H.R. 4541, The Commodity Futures Moderni-
zation Act of 2000, http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts132000.htm (July 19, 2000). 
 13. See generally H.R. Rpt. 106-43 (Feb. 15, 2000) (available at http://commdocs.house.gov/   
committees/ag/hag10643.000/hag10643_0f.htm) (accessed Dec. 5, 2004).  
 14. See Bd. of Trade, 677 F.2d at 1142. 
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2000 (“CFMA”).  The CFMA was a major overhaul of the commodities 
and securities laws15 and had three principal goals: to create legal certainty 
for over-the-counter derivative transactions; to repeal the ban on single-
stock futures; and to provide regulatory relief for futures exchanges.16  The 
CFMA was prompted by concerns among regulators (and Congress) that if 
the United States did not improve its legal treatment of derivatives, the 
market for these instruments would simply flow overseas to foreign ex-
changes and a significant part of American economic activity would thus 
be imperiled.17  The repeal of the ban on single-stock futures was not cen-
tral to the purpose of protecting American futures markets (other aspects of 
the CFMA were aimed at that objective),18 but instead was added to the 
CFMA because the ban was perceived as an unnecessary barrier to market 
activity.  So long as suitable regulation could be achieved, Congress de-
termined to allow trading of single-stock futures.19  The question, there-
fore, was how best to regulate these instruments. 
Ultimately, Congress opted for dual regulation of single-stock futures.  
The merits of dual regulation are discussed in detail in Part IV of this pa-
per, however, briefly stated, dual regulation arose because Congress ac-
cepted that both the SEC and CFTC had compelling regulatory interests in 
single-stock futures.20  For instance, Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the 
  
 15. For example, a printout of the CFMA runs to over 100 pages. See Commodity Futures Moderni-
zation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-365 (Dec. 14, 2000) (incorporating H.R. 
5660 into Appendix E). 
 16. See H.R. Rpt. 106-711(III) at 45 (Sept. 6, 2000) (available at 2000 WL 1279131). 
 17. See e.g. id. at 45-48; see also H.R. Rpt. 106-43 at 10 (recounting statement of Alan Greenspan, 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, on need for updates to futures and derivatives regulation: “Already 
the largest futures exchange in the world is no longer in America’s heartland.  Instead, it is in the heart 
of Europe.  To be sure, no U.S. exchange has yet to lose a major contract to a foreign competitor, but it 
would be a serious mistake for us to wait for such unmistakable evidence of a loss of international 
competitiveness before acting.”). 
 18. For instance, lifting the legislative ban on single-stock futures had no bearing on the main 
CFMA issues of providing predictability for swaps transactions and other over-the-counter derivatives 
or for re-authorization of the CFTC.  This is reflected in some of the testimony before Congress.  See 
e.g. H.R. Rpt. 106-711(III) at 91 (dialogue between Rep. Thomas Ewing and Mr. William Brodsky, 
Chairman of the Chicago Board Options Exchange).  These other derivatives issues were vastly more 
important for futures markets.  E.g. John P. Davidson, Operations Issues for U.S. Single Stock Futures, 
21 No. 4 Futures & Derivatives L. Rep. 1 (June 2001). 
 19. See e.g. H.R. Rpt. 106-711(III) at 47-48. 
 20. For example, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, composed of the leaders of 
the Treasury, Federal Reserve, SEC, and CFTC, described the regulatory issues this way:  
 
From the perspective of the securities laws, the issues raised by trading of single-stock fu-
tures include levels of margin, insider trading, sales practices, real-time trade reporting, and 
activities of floor brokers, as well as the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC over futures 
contract markets.  From the perspective of the commodity futures laws, the issues raised by 
these instruments include clearing, segregation, large trader reporting, and direct surveil-
lance. . . . [T]he Working Group unanimously recommends that these agencies work to-
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Securities and Exchange Commission, defended the SEC’s need to be in-
volved in single-stock futures regulation: “Some might dismiss [the SEC’s 
concerns over single-stock futures] as a guise for protection of turf.  I as-
sure you, the questions surrounding how best to ensure that regulatory dis-
parities do not erode investor confidence are profoundly serious.”21   
The CFTC and SEC conducted months of inter-agency dialogue con-
cerning how to manage dual regulation of single-stock futures,22 and Con-
gress ultimately embraced the following regulatory principles.  First, sin-
gle-stock futures would be recognized as futures and the CFTC’s statutory 
authority under the CEA as the sole futures regulator was amended to pro-
vide that the SEC would share jurisdiction over single-stock futures.23  The 
SEC was then given authority to regulate single-stock futures through 
amendments to the definition of “security” under the securities laws (al-
though the SEC’s authority only extends to single-stock futures, not 
‘broad-based’ security futures, which remain the province of the CFTC 
exclusively).24  Second, single-stock futures were made tradable on either 
futures exchanges or stock exchanges (provided that the exchange regis-
tered with both the CFTC and SEC and picked a primary regulator),25 
while the exchanges could use any approved clearing agency26 to settle 
trades either physically or through cash settlement.27  Third, the CFMA 
authorized the Federal Reserve Board to set margin levels for single-stock 
futures (though the Federal Reserve Board delegated this to the SEC and 
CFTC to determine, as allowed under the CFMA).28  Finally, and most 
importantly, the CFMA provided for shared enforcement of single-stock 
securities futures rules.  Thus, if there is a rule violation or a fraud in the 
  
gether and with Congress to determine whether the trading of single-stock futures should be 
permitted and if so, under what conditions.   
 
Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act, Report of the President’s 
Working Group on Financial Markets at 32 (Nov. 1999) (available at http://www.treas.gov/press/ 
releases/reports/otcact.pdf) (accessed Dec. 5, 2004) (hereinafter “President’s Working Group Report”).  
 21. Michael Schroeder, Deals & Deal Makers: Lugar in Senate Charges CFTC, SEC Impede Bill to 
Deregulate Derivatives, Wall St. J. C26 (June 22, 2000) (quoting statement by former SEC Chairman 
Arthur Levitt’s, before Congress). 
 22. E.g. William J. Rainer, Testimony of William J. Rainer, Chairman of the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches00/oparainer-5.htm (last updated Feb. 1, 2001). 
 23. See Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 at § 251. 
 24. See id. at § 201. 
 25. See id. at §§ 202, 251. 
 26. See id. at §§ 112, 206. 
 27. See id. at § 206. 
 28. See id.; see also Letter from Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board, to 
James E. Newsome, Acting Chairman, CFTC, & Ms. Laura Unger, Acting Chairman, SEC, in 66 Fed. 
Reg. 50720, 50741 (Oct. 4, 2001). 
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sale of a single-stock future, either the CFTC or the SEC may initiate an 
enforcement action, provided it notifies the other agency.29 
This quick sketch of the dual regulatory regime demonstrates that it is 
interconnected with the federal statutes that the CFTC and SEC operate 
under and that these agencies must interact in the regulation and enforce-
ment of single-stock futures.  It clearly would be much simpler if there 
were only one regulator, and single agency regulation would be preferable 
if at all possible.  Many market participants apparently feel this way and 
view dual regulation as cumbersome and dangerously over-regulatory.30 
Yet as will be demonstrated in the next part of this paper, dual regulation is 
an unfortunate necessity because of America’s division of commodities 
and securities regulation into two separate federal agencies with distinct 
mandates. 
IV.  WHY DUAL REGULATION IS REQUIRED AND APPROPRIATE 
It is difficult to find any fans of the dual regulatory regime.  In addition 
to the Chairman of the Chicago Board Options Exchange,31 two law review 
notes criticize dual regulation as a flawed legal regime that creates as many 
problems as it solves.32  These criticisms are not unreasonable.  Dual regu-
lation adds costs, both to market participants (in terms of determining how 
best to comply with potentially confusing or contradictory regulation) and 
to regulators (in terms of the energy needed for inter-agency coordination 
of rule drafting and enforcement actions).  But such concerns miss a cen-
tral point in single-stock futures regulation: some form of dual regulation 
was virtually inevitable because it is necessary to avoid regulatory arbi-
trage and to protect the integrity of domestic securities markets. 
Dual regulation of single-stock futures is required because the United 
States has bifurcated futures and securities regulation between two separate 
federal agencies.  The CFTC and SEC have different areas of responsibility 
and, in the context of single-stock futures, both have important and legiti-
mate regulatory concerns.  First, it would appear self-evident that the 
CFTC should be involved in the regulation of single-stock futures.  Futures 
  
 29. See Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 at §§ 204, 251. 
 30. See e.g. William J. Brodsky, New Legislation Permitting Stock Futures: The Long and Winding 
Road, 21 Nw. J. Intl. L. & Bus. 573, 584 (2001).  
 31. See id.; see also Isabelle Clary, Slow Start Seen for Single-Stock Futures, http:// 
www.pfgbest.com/traders_tools/e_securities.pdf. (Aug./Sept. 2001) (statement of William Brodsky, 
Chairman of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, describing dual regulation as “a challenge”).  
 32. See Sanford A. Fine, Student Author, Back to the (Single Stock) Future: The New Regulatory 
Framework Governing Single-Stock Futures Trading, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 513, 530-33 (2002); Esau, 
supra n. 8, at 950.  
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regulation is what the CFTC does and to remove the agency from an ongo-
ing role in single-stock futures regulation would undermine its very pur-
pose and acknowledged expertise in futures regulation.33  Second, the SEC 
has a compelling interest in single-stock futures regulation because single-
stock futures can act as a surrogate for their underlying securities.34  To 
have consigned single-stock futures regulation to the CFTC alone would 
potentially undermine the integrity of the securities markets.  There is sim-
ply no getting-around the basic necessity for dual regulation. 
This conclusion is reflected in a report of the President’s Working 
Group on Financial Markets.  The President’s Working Group is an infor-
mal association of the four chairmen of the Treasury Department, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission.  In November 1999, the 
Working Group published a report on proposed modifications to the Com-
modities Exchange Act, including recommendations with respect to single-
stock futures.35  In their report, the four chairmen recommended that Con-
gress repeal the prohibition on single-stock futures if concerns of market 
integrity and regulatory arbitrage could be resolved.36  The Working Group 
did not explicitly recommend any form of regulation, but suggested that 
dual regulation might be required due to the important securities and fu-
tures issues involved.37  The Working Group listed the following specific 
concerns: 
From the perspective of the securities laws, the issues raised by 
trading of single-stock futures include levels of margin, insider 
trading, sales practices, real-time trade reporting, and activities of 
floor brokers, as well as the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC 
over futures contract markets.  From the perspective of the com-
modity futures laws, the issues raised by these instruments include 
clearing, segregation, large trader reporting, and direct surveil-
lance.38  
It may reasonably be wondered whether these were legitimate le-
gal/regulatory concerns or just a veneer for regulatory parochialism.39  This 
  
 33. The reader will recall that, aside from the category of single-stock futures, the Commodities 
Exchange Act provides that the CFTC is to have “exclusive” jurisdiction over futures markets and 
futures regulation.  See supra n. 2 and accompanying text. 
 34. See supra n. 12 and accompanying text. 
 35. See President’s Working Group Report, supra n. 20, at 32. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. It must be remembered that the chairmen of both the SEC and CFTC sit on the President’s 
Working Group, and thus made recommendations in this report with respect to their own agencies. 
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paper now examines two of these issues, large trader reporting and insider 
trading, to demonstrate the practical necessity for dual regulation of single-
stock futures.40 
A. Large Trader Reporting  
Large Trader Reporting is an issue in which CFTC and SEC regula-
tions differ and that demonstrates the need for CFTC oversight of single-
stock futures trading.  Large trader reporting is significant in futures regu-
lation, but not in the securities markets.  To begin, the CFTC imposes 
“large trader reporting” on futures commission merchants, clearing mem-
bers, and futures brokers.41  Large trader reporting is basically a complex 
reporting system whereby the CFTC traces ongoing open market positions 
down to the level of beneficial ownership in order to maintain near-real-
time monitoring of large, open positions in the futures markets.42  The 
CFTC considers large trader reporting to be an essential tool in preventing 
price manipulation in the futures markets because, at any given time, as 
much as ninety percent of open market positions may be held by only a 
few large traders, giving these entities significant market power.43  Due to 
the perceived importance of large trader reporting in the futures markets, 
the CFTC has insisted that these obligations be imposed on the trading of 
single-stock futures.44   
There is no comparable system in the securities markets (although in 
the past the SEC has considered adopting such a system).45  Instead, the 
securities markets are regulated through the Securities Act’s and Securities 
Exchange Act’s complex reporting and disclosure rules, suitability rules, 
antifraud protections, and like requirements.  Assuming then that CFTC 
and SEC are correct in their respective views of the need for large trader 
  
 40. This paper assumes without deciding that current regulation of futures and securities markets is 
appropriate and, therefore, that a fundamental goal of single-stock futures regulation must be to make 
single-stock futures markets function effectively within the existing regulatory framework. 
 41. See Reporting Levels for Large Trader Reports; Securities Futures Products, 66 Fed. Reg. 
64383, 64383 (Dec. 13, 2001). 
 42. See Commodities Futures Trading Commission, CFTC’s Large Trader Reporting System, 
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/backgrounder/opa-ltrs.htm (last updated Oct. 3, 2001).  
 43. See Reporting Levels for Large Trader Reports; TRAKRS, 67 Fed. Reg. 64522, 64523 (Oct. 21, 
2002) (“These market surveillance programs are designed to detect and to prevent market congestion 
and price manipulation and to enforce speculative position limits.  They also provide information 
regarding the overall hedging and speculative use of, and foreign participation in, the futures markets 
and other matters of public interest.”).  
 44. See Reporting Levels for Large Trader Reports; Securities Futures Products, 66 Fed Reg. at 
64383. 
 45. See e.g. Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Deriva-
tives Regulation in the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 Brook J. Intl. L. 319, 346 n.134 
(2003). 
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reporting in the futures and securities markets,46 it follows that large trader 
reporting oversight by the CFTC should be a part of the regulation of sin-
gle-stock futures. The CFTC has a system in place to monitor large trader 
reports (and futures participants understand this obligation) whereas the 
SEC has no similar institutional experience.  More importantly, CFTC-
regulated large trader reporting of single-stock futures is essential to main-
taining consistency among futures regulation.  Not imposing large trader 
reporting requirements on single-stock futures while requiring it of other 
futures markets would be dangerous: such a regulatory disparity would, 
other things being equal, undermine futures regulation by creating an in-
centive for capital to flow toward the less-regulated single-stock futures 
markets and away from the other (more highly-regulated) futures markets.  
Making single-stock futures regulation consistent with other futures regula-
tion is thus a legitimate regulatory consideration. 
B. Insider Trading  
Large trader reporting is one issue (out of at least four identified by the 
President’s Working Group)47 that demonstrates why the CFTC needs to 
have a role in single-stock futures regulation.   On the other hand, insider 
trading demonstrates a compelling reason for the SEC to be involved as 
well.  In fact, insider trading perhaps as much as any issue demonstrates 
that dual regulation of single-stock futures is a practical necessity. 
There is reasonable debate among academics and others as to whether 
insider trading (that is, trading on the basis of material48 non-public infor-
mation) should be prohibited in securities or futures markets and, if so, to 
what extent.49  This paper does not take-up this question.  Instead, this pa-
per assumes that current insider trading rules in the securities and com-
modities markets are appropriate for each system.  Based on this assump-
tion, this paper then focuses on the disparities between these two regula-
tory schemes to argue that dual regulation of single-stock futures is made a 
practical necessity thereby.   
  
 46. See Brian P. Volkman, Defining the Role of Commodities Regulators, 19 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Intl. & 
Comp. L. 215, 238-39 (1999) (for a review of arguments that large trader reporting is an unnecessary 
burden on the marketplace). 
 47. For the specific issues raised, review the text accompanying supra note 38. 
 48. “Materiality” is a loaded term in both commodities and securities law, but generally has the 
same connotations.  Basically, it means that certain information is important.  CFTC Regulation 1.59 
defines “materiality” as: “information which, if such information were publicly known, would be 
considered important by a reasonable person in deciding whether to trade a particular commodity 
interest on a contract market.”  See 17 C.F.R. § 1.59(a)(5) (2004).  The securities laws have a similar 
standard.  See e.g. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).  
 49. See e.g. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the 
Coin of the Realm of in the Information Age, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 443 (2001). 
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The SEC and CFTC have taken dramatically different regulatory 
stances with respect to the issue of insider trading.  In the securities mar-
kets, insider trading is fraud.  Specifically, a person violates Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act,  
when he or she buys or sells securities on the basis of material, 
non-public information and at the same time is an insider of the 
corporation whose securities are traded, or [is] a tippee who knows 
or should know of the insider’s breach of duty.  The theory is that 
an insider owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders 
not to trade on inside information for his personal benefit.50   
Insider trading often involves complex factual situations, and insider 
trading cases can be categorized into at least three groups.  First, a basic 
insider trading case can involve an employee’s or fiduciary’s trading com-
pany stock on the basis of material, non-public information in breach of a 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the company.51  The essence of the 
securities fraud is the breach of fiduciary duty to the company’s sharehold-
ers.  Second, ‘tipper-tippee’ cases involve situations in which an insider 
breaches his fiduciary duties to a company by disclosing inside information 
about the company to another person and the ‘tippee’ then trades on the 
information, recognizing that the insider has violated a duty in disclosing 
the useful information.  In these cases, the tipper and tippee my both be 
guilty of securities fraud.52  A third type of insider trading case is a ‘misap-
propriation’ situation in which an outsider becomes aware of material non-
public information about a company through work for a third party and 
breaches a duty to the third party, i.e., misappropriates the information - by 
trading on it.53  These three general categories of insider trading demon-
strate that, under the securities laws, both insiders and outsiders of a corpo-
rate issuer can commit securities fraud in certain circumstances by trading 
on the basis of material non-public information.54   
In contrast with the securities markets, insider trading is generally not 
prohibited in the futures markets.55  The CFTC prohibits insider trading 
through its Regulation 1.59, but this only affects market professionals.  For 
instance, the regulation prohibits brokers from trading ahead of a client (as 
  
 50. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 408-09 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 51. See e.g. U.S. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998); cf. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 52. See e.g. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 53. See e.g. U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 54. Of course, the elements in an insider trading case are much more complicated than outlined here.  
However, this discussion demonstrates the point that insider trading liability potentially extends very 
broadly in the securities markets.   
 55. See generally Nina Swift Goodman, Trading in Commodity Futures Using Nonpublic Informa-
tion, 73 Geo. L.J. 127 (1984). 
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otherwise the broker could deprive the client of a better price achieved by 
the broker’s earlier trading) and restricts trading by market regulators (so 
as to prevent exchange employees from profiting on the basis of informa-
tion acquired through their work at the futures exchange).56  These situa-
tions are seen to involve breaches of fiduciary duties by market profession-
als to market participants.57  Otherwise, though, there are no general prohi-
bitions against market participants’ trading on the basis of material non-
public information.  The CFTC has considered adopting insider trading 
prohibitions similar to those imposed through the securities laws, but has 
rejected the idea as unnecessary and undesirable.58  The reasons for this 
include problems of policing insider trading by the CFTC59 and the 
CFTC’s limited view of fiduciary duty obligations in the futures market-
place.60  
More generally, though, the divergent insider trading rules in the secu-
rities and futures markets reflects fundamentally distinct views on the na-
ture of insider trading.  Insider trading is not proscribed in the futures mar-
kets because, ultimately, trading on the basis of proprietary information is 
necessary to achieve market goals of providing pricing efficiency and 
hedging opportunities.61  Market participants are not prohibited from trad-
ing on the basis of proprietary information because this is the basis for 
their economic motivation to enter the futures markets at all - that is, if 
market participants could not speculate or hedge, the fundamental purposes 
of the futures markets would be thwarted.  Furthermore, the closest ana-
logue to insider trading in the futures markets, trading by individuals who 
possess material information through a relationship with another market 
participant (e.g. an employee of a grain company trading in the futures 
markets based on his knowledge of the company’s upcoming grain futures 
trades), is not proscribed even where there is a breach of fiduciary duty 
because the CFTC simply does not consider this to be a market problem.62  
The ‘insider’ may be defeating his employer’s goals by taking advantage 
  
 56. See Jerry W. Markham, ‘Front-Running’—Insider Trading Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 
38 Cath. U. L. Rev. 69, 94, 110 (1988) (discussing CFTC Regulation 1.59, 17 C.F.R. § 1.59 (2004)). 
 57. Id. at 106. 
 58. The CFTC issued a report to Congress in 1984 on the issue of insider trading in the futures 
markets in which the CFTC recommended against prohibiting the practice.  See Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, A Study of the Nature, Extent and Effects of Futures Trading by Persons Pos-
sessing Material, Nonpublic Information (Sept. 1984); see also Markham, supra n. 45, at 352 & nn. 
171-72. 
 59. See Markham, supra n. 56, at 108. 
 60. Id. at 106. 
 61. Id. at 93-94. 
 62. See id. at 104-07. 
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of the inside information about its future trading activity, but the insider is 
not deceiving or manipulating the market, the CFTC’s principle concern.63   
The CFTC’s approach to insider trading in the futures markets (which 
may appropriately be described as laissez-faire) thus differs markedly from 
the SEC’s consideration of the issue.64  This is an important point in single-
stock futures regulation. For if the CFTC had been given sole responsibil-
ity for regulating single-stock futures, it would have had to either adopt the 
insider trading prohibitions contained in the securities markets or permit a 
significant disparity between securities regulation and single-stock futures 
regulation.  Neither option is practicable. 
First, the CFTC would have been hard-pressed to graft insider trading 
rules onto its regulation of single-stock futures.  Insider trading rules in the 
securities markets are principally judge-made and it would be difficult to 
recreate the securities-law scheme under the Commodities Exchange Act 
or by CFTC rules.  Furthermore, this would potentially require continuous 
updating by the CFTC to keep its rules for single-stock futures consistent 
with those of the securities markets.  The CFTC might attempt to avoid this 
problem entirely through a blanket prohibition against insiders’ trading 
their own companies’ single-stock futures65 (indeed, such a blanket prohi-
bition would provide the most obvious protection against insiders illicitly 
profiting in the futures markets), however, such a prohibition would need 
to extend to the insiders’ families and friends in order to avoid tipper-
tippee situations.  Policing such a rule would be extremely difficult for the 
CFTC, since it has no system to monitor such insider trading activity.   
An alternative to the CFTC’s adopting insider trading rules for single-
stock futures regulation would be to avoid the issue by allowing insider 
trading in the market for securities futures.  But this is equally undesirable 
- and surely politically impossible.  Congress and the public would never 
tolerate a system whereby corporate executives are allowed to profit by 
trading single-stock futures based upon their knowledge of their com-
pany’s upcoming activities.  Because of the importance of insider trading 
regulation and the impracticability of regulating insider trading through the 
  
 63. See id. at 108.  
 64. Thomas C. Newkirk, Speech, Speech by SEC Staff: Insider Trading – A U.S. Perspective (Cam-
bridge, England, Sept. 19, 1998) (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/ 
spch221.htm) (accessed Dec. 5, 2004) (for an example of the SEC’s view that insider trading is damag-
ing to the securities markets and requires vigorous enforcement). 
 65. Congress could authorize the CFTC to completely proscribe insiders (employees, independent 
contractors, agents, etc.) from trading in the single-stock futures of their companies.  For instance, such 
a prohibition ought not violate constitutional issues of substantive due process or equal protection 
because single-stock futures trading is not a fundamental right, and employment by or for a company 
does not create a protected class. 
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futures markets, the SEC therefore needs to be involved in single-stock 
futures regulation, and dual regulation is made a practical necessity. 
C. Regulatory Arbitrage  
The preceding discussion has touched on only two issues (among po-
tentially many others)66 that demonstrate the need for careful coordination 
of single-stock futures regulation between the CFTC and the SEC.  Implicit 
in this discussion, though, has been another issue: the need to avoid “regu-
latory arbitrage.”  The concept of regulatory arbitrage ties together a num-
ber of threads in this paper and provides a theoretical foundation for under-
standing why dual regulation of single-stock futures is required. 
Regulatory arbitrage is the process of taking advantage of divergent 
regulatory regimes that govern similar financial products so as to profit 
from disparities between the regulation of the products (either through re-
duced costs or increased income).  “The numerous opportunities for regu-
latory arbitrage derive from a widely-understood, basic concept in modern 
finance: a party to financial transactions may use a variety of different trad-
ing strategies to achieve the same economically-equivalent position.”67  
Because U.S. markets for securities and options on securities are robust, if 
the market for single-stock futures became subject to significantly less 
regulation (as are future markets generally), economic activity would flow 
away from the securities and options markets and toward the single-stock 
futures markets.  Such a regulatory imbalance would undermine the pur-
poses of securities regulation and would disrupt the financial markets.68  
Avoiding regulatory arbitrage is an important (even critical) issue in sin-
gle-stock futures regulation.  
V.  DUAL REGULATION IN PRACTICE AND THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
Single-stock futures began trading on two dedicated exchanges, 
OneChicago and Nasdaq-Liffe, in November 2002.69  So far, they have not 
  
 66. The reader will recall that the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets identified ten 
securities and commodities issues that it considered significant.  Review the text accompanying supra 
note 38. 
 67. Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. Corp. L. 211, 
227 (1997). 
 68. This paper is not evaluating whether all the current regulations imposed on securities and op-
tions are necessary.  Instead, this paper argues that because of the system we have created, dual regula-
tion of single-stock futures necessarily follows. 
 69. See Bloomberg News, Single Stock Futures Volume Falls as War Captures Investors’ Focus, 
Chi. Trib. C2 (May 4, 2003). 
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been very popular with investors.70  For example, in December 2003, some 
three hundred thousand single-stock futures contracts traded on OneChi-
cago, but 27.2 million securities options traded on its neighbor, the Chi-
cago Board Options Exchange.71  Because of this lackluster market per-
formance, Chairman Newsome of the CFTC has recently indicated that he 
will ask Congress to give the CFTC sole authority to regulate single-stock 
futures.  “Joint regulation ‘is too burdensome, too cumbersome and quite 
unnecessary to protect the public good . . . .  We are going to ask Congress 
specifically to take a look at the need for having a dual regulatory envi-
ronment.’”72  Congress should not jump so quickly. 
Abandoning dual regulation at this stage is unwarranted and potentially 
dangerous.  Chairman Newsome is no doubt correct in his statement that 
dual regulation is burdensome and cumbersome, but this paper argues that 
he goes too far to say that it is unnecessary.  First, the fact that the market 
for single-stock futures has been poor to date under the dual regulatory 
system says nothing a priori as to whether the current system is fatally 
flawed.73  This is a new market product, with complex regulation, being 
introduced at a unique time in the nation’s economic history (i.e., after 
significant stock market declines in recent years, numerous corporate scan-
dals, a major terrorist attack, and ongoing foreign wars).  It is not unrea-
sonable to assume that it might take many months for the market to warm 
to single-stock futures.  Second, the dual regulatory system has only re-
cently been finalized with respect to important issues such as sharing in-
formation and oversight responsibilities,74 setting margin requirements,75 
and establishing settlement procedures.76  It may take awhile for market 
participants to become comfortable with this new product and with dual-
regulation.  For these reasons, the market should be given time to develop 
under the current regulatory regime and, if changes are needed, the CFTC 
and SEC should negotiate those changes.  But dropping dual regulation 
  
 70. E.g. Alex Skorecki, All Eyes are on EuroNext Exchanges, Fin. Times (London, England) 27 
(Dec. 8, 2003). 
 71. See Mark Skertic, CBOT Starts New Era with Merc Link, Chi. Trib. C1 (Jan. 3, 2004). 
 72. See Bloomberg News, Regulator Weighs In on Stock Futures, Chi. Trib. C3 (Mar. 18, 2004) 
(quoting Chairman James Newsome of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission). 
 73. For instance, it is entirely possible that the current regulatory regime is appropriate but that the 
limited interest in single-stock futures simply reflects improper marketing of these instruments to 
investors. 
 74. See SEC, SEC and CFTC Sign Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Oversight of Security 
Futures Product Trading and Sharing of Security Futures Product Information, Securities and Ex-
change Commission Release 2004-36 (Mar. 17, 2004) (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2004-36.htm). 
 75. See Customer Margin Rules Relating to Security Futures; Joint Final Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 53146 
(Aug. 14, 2002), to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 41, 242.  
 76. See Cash Settlement and Regulatory Halt Requirements for Security Futures Products; Final 
Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 36739 (May 24, 2002), to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 41, 240.  
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entirely so soon after its inauguration would be unwarranted and poten-
tially dangerous. 
Removing the SEC from the regulatory picture would be potentially 
dangerous because, as Chairman Levitt has stated, single-stock futures 
raise “profoundly serious” questions for securities regulation.77  Insider 
trading provides just one example of this.  As demonstrated herein, assum-
ing that insider trading restrictions are important for the integrity of the 
securities markets, it is necessary for the SEC to enforce these rules with 
respect to single-stock futures.  Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how 
one might carve-out a limited enforcement role for the SEC leaving the 
CFTC as the sole primary regulator and rule-maker.  The reason for this is 
that the SEC’s enforcement functions are inseparable from its regula-
tory/rule-making functions.  For example, the insider trading rules began in 
the courts,78 but then migrated into the SEC rulebook.79  In the end, it ap-
pears that what Chairman Newsome is really lamenting with respect to 
dual regulation of single-stock futures is its simple inevitability due to the 
fact that the United States has bifurcated securities and futures regulation 
between two competing federal agencies,80 and that such a division of re-




 77. See supra n. 21 and accompanying text. 
 78. See supra nn. 50-54 and accompanying text. 
 79. For instance, the SEC has adopted Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2004), and Rule 10b5-
2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2004), to proscribe certain insider trading activity and to resolve disputes 
among courts as to where insider trading liability should and should not lie.  See SEC, Insider Trading, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last updated Apr. 19, 2001).  
 80. See Markham, supra n. 45 (for a discussion of comparative regulatory regimes and a discussion 
of interagency conflict between the CFTC and SEC). 
